






Why do sovereign states sometimes fail to settle territorial disputes peacefully? Also,
why do even peaceful settlements of territorial disputes rarely call for the resulting border to
be unfortiﬁed? This paper explores a class of answers to these questions that is based on the
following premise: States can settle a territorial dispute peacefully only if (1) their payoﬀs
from a peaceful settlement are larger than their expected payoﬀs from a default to war, and (2)
their promises not to attack are credible. This premise directs the analysis to such factors
as the advantage of attacking over both defending and counterattacking, the divisibility of
the contested territory, the possibility of recurring war, the depreciation or obsolescence of
fortiﬁcations, and inequality in the eﬀectiveness of mobilized resources.
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Enrico Spolaore for helpful advice.Throughout history territorial disputes have been the principle source of conﬂict
l e a d i n gt ow a r...[ Y e t , ]i nt h ep o s t - W o r l dW a rI Ip e r i o do v e ro n e - h a l fo fa l l
territorial disputes did not involve the threat or use of military force . . . While
m o s tw a r s...i n v o l v ec o n ﬂicts over territory, many territorial disputes do not
pose a high risk of war. (Paul Huth, 1996, pages 6-10).
Why do sovereign states sometimes fail to settle territorial disputes peacefully? Also,
why do even peaceful settlements of territorial disputes rarely call for the resulting border to
be unfortiﬁed? These questions arise because in fact most territorial disputes are settled
peacefully, and because, war being costly, it is natural to conjecture that every territorial
dispute should aﬀord a peaceful settlement. Also, in the same spirit, it is natural to conjec-
ture that peaceful settlements of territorial disputes should avoid the costs of fortifying the
resulting border.
Attempts to explain why states sometimes choose to go to war commonly focus on the
eﬀects of incomplete information.1 The present paper, without denying the historical im-
portance of incomplete information as a cause of war, explores another class of answers to
the question of why some territorial disputes result in war. This class of answers is based on
the following premise:
States can settle a dispute peacefully only if (1) their payoﬀsf r o map e a c e f u l
settlement are larger than their expected payoﬀs from a default to war, and (2)
their promises not to attack are credible.
1Dagobert Brito and Michael Intriligator (1985) show how incomplete information, by causing a state to be
overly optimistic about its prospects for winning a war cheaply, can prevent a peaceful settlement of a dispute.
James Fearon (1995) and Herschel Grossman (2004) discuss historical examples in which overoptimism seems
to have been an important factor in the decision to go to war. Also, because of incomplete information, going
to war can be a worthwhile investment in reputation. As Fearon (1995, page 400) puts it, “States employ
war itself as a costly signal of privately known and otherwise unveriﬁable information about willingness to
ﬁght...[and] as a credible means to reveal private information about their military capabilities.”
1In other words, states can settle a dispute peacefully only if a peaceful settlement is on their
contract curve and also is subgame perfect. Given this premise the question of why states
sometimes choose to go to war becomes why do some territorial disputes not aﬀord peaceful
settlements that satisfy these two conditions.
Recognition of the problem of credibility also suggests an answer to the question of why
borders are usually fortiﬁed:
Although fortiﬁcations are costly, fortiﬁcations can help to make a peaceful set-
tlement credible.
This answer is embodied in the popular observation, “Good fences make good neighbors.”
More generally, the possibility that fortiﬁcations are the key to peaceful settlements is embod-
ied in the prescription: Qui desiderat pacem, preparet bellum. In this context, fortiﬁcations
include but are not limited to defensive works that are literally on the border.
Analytical Framework
Assume that two sovereign states, State 1 and State 2, face a newly arisen dispute over
control of a valuable territory. Either these states settle this dispute peacefully or by default
they ﬁght a war to settle the dispute. A peaceful settlement would give each state control
of a non-negative fraction of the contested territory, with the resulting border being either
unfortiﬁed or fortiﬁed. A war would give each state a non-negative probability of winning
control of the entire contested territory.
Within this framework a state’s strategy set consists of the following elements:
• the amount to spend to mobilize resources in the event of a default to war;
• the amount to spend to construct fortiﬁcations in the event of a peaceful settlement;
• whether or not to agree to a peaceful settlement;
• w h e t h e rt ok e e po rt ob r e a kap r o m i s en o tt oa t t a c k ;
• the amount to spend to mobilize resources if it were to break a promise not to attack;
2• the amount to spend to mobilize resources for a counterattack if the other state were
to break a promise not to attack.
The core choice-theoretic assumption is that the states choose the elements of their strat-
egy sets to maximize the expected payoﬀ for which each element is relevant. For example,
each state chooses the amount to spend to mobilize resources in the event of a default to
war to maximize its expected payoﬀ from a default to war. In addition the analysis assumes
that in choosing its strategy set each state takes the other state’s strategy set as given.2
To circumscribe the analytical framework the model maintains the following simplifying
assumptions:
• The two states put the same value on controlling the contested territory. They also
put the same value on controlling any part of the contested territory. These valuations
take no account of any preference of the inhabitants of the contested territory to be
aﬃliated with one state or the other.3
• Attacking has an advantage over defending in the sense that with equal amounts spent
to mobilize resources for an attack and to construct fortiﬁcations the probability of the
attacker prevailing would be larger than one half. In the same sense, attacking has an
advantage over counterattacking – that is, there is an advantage to striking ﬁrst.
• The states behave as if they are unitary and autonomous agents. Neither their internal
politics nor their relations with other states bear on this dispute.4
2An alternative would be to assume that one state is a Stackelberg leader along the lines of the models
in Dmitriy Gershenson and Grossman (2000) and in Grossman and Mendoza (2004).
3In contrast Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore (1997, 2003, 2004) analyze models in which the prefer-
ences of inhabitants for public goods determine the incorporation of regions into sovereign states.
4Recent studies of the relation between politics and interstate war include Michelle Garﬁnkel (1994),
Gregory Hess and Athanasios Orphanides (1995, 2001), and Paul Huth (1996). In a study of civil conﬂicts
Barbara Walter (2002) argues that in the past the intervention of third parties has been critical in making
peaceful settlements credible.
3• In evaluating the costs of a war the states consider only the amounts spent to mobilize
resources. The states ignore the possible havoc of war.5
• In choosing its strategy set neither state faces a binding constraint on its ability to
mobilize resources. This assumption impliest h a tn oe l e m e n t so ft h es t r a t e g ys e tc a l l
for a total mobilization of resources.
• All relevant parameters are common knowledge.
This last assumption implies that the states can correctly assess the credibility of each
other’s promises not to attack. Hence, this model abstracts from the possibility of a surprise
attack that contravenes a peaceful settlement. In this model war occurs only if the states
fail to reach a peaceful settlement.
To focus on the essential elements of the choice between peace and war, the analysis also
initially makes the following working assumptions:
• The whole of the territory is neither more not less valuable than the sum of its parts.
• The winner of a war would get permanent control of the contested territory.
• Fortiﬁcations neither depreciate nor become obsolete.
• The states have the same eﬀectiveness of amounts spent to mobilize resources.
Eventually the analysis relaxes each of these working assumptions.
T h eC o n s e q u e n c e so faD e f a u l tt oW a r
Let Ni,i ∈ {1,2}, denote the expected payoﬀ for State i from a default to war. Given
that the winner of a war would get permanent control of the contested territory, we have
(1) Ni = piV − Ri,
where pi,p i ∈ [0,1], denotes the probability that State i would win a war that these
5If a war could cause signiﬁcant havoc, then taking account of the expected havoc would decrease the
expected payoﬀ from a default to war and would enhance the possibility of a peaceful settlement.
4states ﬁght by default, where V, V ∈ (0,∞), denotes the present value for either state of
having permanent control of the contested territory, and where Ri,R i ∈ (0,V), denotes
the amount that State i would spend to mobilize resources in the event of a default to war.
Equation (1) says that the expected payoﬀ for State i from a default to war equals the product
of the probability that it would win the war and the value of having permanent control of
the contested territory, minus the amount that it would spend to mobilize resources.
To determine the probability that State i would win a war that these states ﬁght by






In equation (2) pi is an increasing concave function of the ratio, Ri/Rj. Equation (2)
incorporates both the assumption that the dispute is newly arisen and, hence, that the
contested territory is initially unfortiﬁed and the working assumption that the states have
t h es a m ee ﬀectiveness of amounts spent to mobilize resources.6
In the event of a default to war, to maximize its expected payoﬀ State i would choose







Using equation (2) to calculate ∂pi/∂Ri, this ﬁrst-order condition implies the reaction
function,
6Related analyses of the causes of war in Fearon (1995) and in Grossman (2004) take the probabilities of
winning a war and the costs of a war as given. In contrast, the present analysis, which follows the lead of
Garﬁnkel (1990) and Robert Powell (1993), starts by specifying contest-success functions, given by equation
(2) and by equation (9) below, and then shows how the probabilities of winning a war and the credibility of
promises not to attack derive from the choices that states would make to mobilize resources.
7This ﬁrst-order condition, as well as other ﬁrst-order conditions speciﬁed below, accords with the as-
sumption that neither state faces a binding constraint on its ability to mobilize resources.
5(3) Ri =
q
VR j − Rj.
Solving equations (3) for R1 and R2 and substituting into equations (1) and (2) we obtain
(4) R1 = R2 = V/4a n dN1 = N2 = V/4.
Equations (4) imply that in a default to war spending to mobilize resources would dissipate
half of the value of having permanent control of the contested territory.
A Peaceful Settlement
Suppose that these states, seeking an alternative that is preferable to a default to war,
were to attempt to settle their territorial dispute peacefully. Speciﬁcally, suppose that these
states were to consider a peaceful settlement with three provisions:
• The states divide control of the contested territory with State i getting permanent
control of the non-negative fraction ki, where ki + kj =1 .
• Each state can construct a permanent fortiﬁcation on the resulting border. State i
spends R∗
i,R ∗
i ∈ [0,∞), to construct its fortiﬁcation. If R∗
i equals zero, then the
border is unfortiﬁed.
• Each state promises not to attack in an attempt to gain control of the entire contested
territory.
State i would prefer this peaceful settlement to a default to war only if its payoﬀ from this
peaceful settlement would be larger than its expected payoﬀ from a default to war.8 Given
the working assumption that the whole of the territory is neither more not less valuable than
8Powell (1993) considers the possibility of a peaceful settlement with a fortiﬁed border, but in this analysis
he takes the division of the contested territory as given, rather than as subject to negotiation as in the present
analysis. Powell (1999) considers the possibility of a negotiated division of the contested territory, but in
this analysis he takes each state’s prospects for success in war as given.
6the sum of its parts, the value of permanently controlling the fraction ki of the contested
territory would be kiV, and the payoﬀ to State i from this peaceful settlement would be
kiV − R∗
i. Accordingly, State i would prefer this peaceful settlement to a default to war
only if ki is large enough and R∗
i is small enough that this peaceful settlement satisﬁes
(5) kiV − R
∗
i >N i,
where, from equation (4), Ni equals V/4.
Given that k1 + k2 =1 , condition (5) is satisﬁed for both State 1 and State 2 if and
only if R∗
1,R ∗










With both N1 and N2 and both R1 and R2 equal to V/4, there exists at least one







2 <V / 2=R1 + R2.
Condition (7) says that there exists a division of the contested territory such that both
states would prefer a peaceful settlement to a default to war only if the total amount that
the two states would spend to construct fortiﬁcations under this peaceful settlement would
be smaller than total amount that the two states would spend to mobilize resources in the
event of a default to war.
The Expected Payoﬀ from Attacking
In a peaceful settlement each state promises not to attack in an attempt to gain control
of the entire contested territory. With R∗
1+R∗
2 smaller than R1+R2, w o u l ds u c hp r o m i s e s
be credibility? Given that the states choose their strategy sets to maximize their expected
payoﬀs, a promise by State i not to attack would be credible only if the expected payoﬀ for
State i from keeping its promise would at least as large as its expected payoﬀ from breaking
its promise and attacking.
7Let ˜ Ni denote the expected payoﬀ to State i from breaking its promise not to attack.
Given that the winner of a war would get permanent control of the contested territory, and
that State i already has spent R∗
i to fortify the border, we have
(8) ˜ Ni =˜ piV − (R
∗
i + ˜ Ri),
where ˜ pi, ˜ pi ∈ [0,1], denotes the probability that, if State i attacks, it would win the
resulting war, and where ˜ Ri, ˜ Ri ∈ (0,V), denotes the amount that State i would spend to
mobilize resources for an attack.
Let R∗∗
j ,R ∗∗
j ∈ (0,V), denote the amount that, if State i were to attack, State j would
spend to mobilize resources for a counterattack. In this formulation resources mobilized for
a counterattack diﬀer from fortiﬁcations in that states decide to mobilize resources for a
counterattack only in response to an attack. In other words, State j would choose R∗∗
j as
ar e a c t i o nt o ˜ Ri, whereas State j spends R∗
j to fortify the border before State i chooses
whether or not to attack.
To determine the probability that, if State i attacks, it would win the resulting war,
assume that ˜ pi depends on ˜ Ri,R ∗
j, and R∗∗
j according to the contest-success function,
(9) ˜ pi =
θ ˜ Ri





, θ ∈ [0,∞), φ ∈ [0,θ), γ ∈ [0,θ).
In equation (9) the parameter θ measures the eﬀectiveness of amounts spent to mobilize
resources for an attack, the parameter φ measures the eﬀectiveness of amounts spent
to construct fortiﬁcations, and the parameter γ measures the eﬀectiveness of amounts
spent to mobilize resources for a counterattack. The speciﬁcation that φ is smaller than θ
formalizes the assumption that attacking has an advantage over defending. The speciﬁcation
that γ is smaller than θ formalizes the assumption that attacking has an advantage over
counterattacking. In accord with our working assumption that the states have the same
eﬀectiveness of amounts spent to mobilize resources, equation (9) assumes that θ, φ, and
γ are the same for both states.
8Given that both γ and φ are smaller than θ, each state would agree to a peaceful
settlement only if the other state’s promise not to attack is credible. Speciﬁcally, State j
would have a larger expected payoﬀ from a default to war than it would have if it were to
agree to a peaceful settlement and State i were to break its promise not to attack.
If State i were to attack, then to maximize its expected payoﬀ from attacking, taking
as given the strength of the fortiﬁcations and counterattacks with which it would have to




=0 a n d ˜ Ri > 0, or
d ˜ Ni
d ˜ Ri







Using equation (9) to calculate ∂˜ pi/∂ ˜ Ri, this ﬁrst-order condition implies the reaction
function,













If State i were to attack, how much would State j spend to mobilize resources for a
counterattack? Let N∗
j denote the expected payoﬀ to State j if State i were to attack.









If State i were to attack, then State j to maximize its expected payoﬀ from a counterat-
tack, having already spent R∗
j to fortify the border, and taking ˜ Ri as given, would choose
R∗∗
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Using equation (9) to calculate ∂˜ pi/∂R∗∗
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9Combining equations (10) and (12) yields the following solutions for ˜ Ri and R∗∗
j :
(13) θ ˜ Ri =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨

































In equation (13) the ﬁrst line accounts for the possibility that R∗
j is so small that both
˜ Ri and R∗∗
j would be positive, the second line accounts for the possibility that R∗
j is
large enough that, although ˜ Ri would be positive, R∗∗
j would be zero, and the third line
accounts for the possibility that R∗
j is so large that both ˜ Ri and R∗∗
j would be zero.
Substituting equations (9), (13), and (14) into equation (8) to determine the payoﬀ that
State i would expect if it were to break its promise not to attack, we obtain
(15) ˜ Ni =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨






























Recalling that the payoﬀ to State i from a peaceful settlement would be kiV − R∗
i, the
promise of State i not to attack would be credible only if ki and R∗
j taken together are
large enough to satisfy the credibility condition, kiV − R∗
i ≥ ˜ Ni. Equivalently we can
express this credibility condition as
(16) ki ≥ Zi, where Zi ≡




10If condition (16) is satisﬁed, then for State i the payoﬀ from a peaceful settlement is at least
as large as the expected payoﬀ from attacking. In other words, if condition (16) is satisﬁed,
then for State i the possibility of gaining kjV if it attacks and then wins the resulting war
does not outweigh the cost of mobilizing resources for an attack together with the possibility
of losing kiV if it attacks and does not win the resulting war.
Given that k1 + k2 =1 , condition (16) is satisﬁed both for State 1 and for State 2 if
and only if k1 satisﬁes
(17) 1 − Z2 ≥ k1 ≥ Z1.
There exists at least one value of k1 that satisﬁes condition (17) if and only if the sum,
Z1 + Z2, is not larger than one.
An Unfortiﬁed Border?
Suppose that the states are considering a peaceful settlement with an unfortiﬁed border.
With both R∗
1 and R∗
2 equal to zero, equation (15) and the deﬁnition of Zi imply that




. Hence, both R∗
1 and R∗
2 equal to zero is consistent








Condition (18) implies the following proposition:
(I) If amounts spent to mobilize resources for a counterattack would be suﬃciently
eﬀective relative to amounts spent to mobilize resources for an attack, then the
states can reach a credible peaceful settlement with an unfortiﬁed border.9,10
9Even if condition (18) is satisﬁed, a peaceful settlement with an unfortiﬁed border is not a unique (Nash)
equilibrium. But, if condition (18) is satisﬁed, then we can presume that the promises of both states not to
attack serve to allow the states to coordinate on this equilibrium.
10The model developed in Grossman (2004) and applied to the American Civil War abstracts from the
11A Peaceful Settlement with a Fortiﬁed Border?
Suppose that the ratio γ/θ does not satisfy condition (18). In that case we see from
equation (15) and the deﬁnition of Zi that, in addition to not being consistent with both
R∗
1 and R∗
2 equal to zero, the sum, Z1 + Z2, being not larger than one would not be
consistent with both φR∗
1 and φR∗
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0f o r φR∗
j > θV.
Solving the quadratic equation obtained by setting Z1 + Z2 equal to one, we ﬁnd that the
minimum values of the R∗
1 and R∗















Recall that for both states the payoﬀ from a peaceful settlement would be larger than the
expected payoﬀ from a default to war only if the sum, R∗
1 + R∗
2, is smaller than R1 + R2,
which equals V/2. For R∗
1 + R∗
2, as implied by equation (20), to be smaller than V/2,


















Condition (21) implies the following proposition:
distinction between attacking and counterattacking. Hence, that model implicitly assumes that γ equals θ,
and, accordingly, that the analog of condition (18) is satisﬁed. That model focuses on overoptimism about
the prospects of winning a war cheaply as a necessary part of an explanation for the choice to go to war.
12(II) If a peaceful settlement with an unfortiﬁed border would not be credible, but
if amounts spent to construct fortiﬁcations would be suﬃciently eﬀective relative
to amounts spent to mobilize resources for an attack, then the states can reach
a peaceful settlement with a fortiﬁed border that is credible and preferable to a
default to war.
In addition, equation (20) implies that in such a peaceful settlement the amount that each
state would have to spend to construct fortiﬁcations would be a decreasing function of φ/θ.
Figure 1 depicts the derivation of this result.
According to Proposition (I) the possibility of a credible peaceful settlement with an
unfortiﬁed border depends on the relative eﬀectiveness of amounts spent to mobilize resources
for a counterattack, whereas according to Proposition (II) the possibility of a credible peace-
ful settlement with a fortiﬁed border depends on the relative eﬀectiveness of amounts spent to
construct fortiﬁcations. The converse of Propositions (I) and (II) is also worth emphasizing.
(III) If both amounts spent to mobilize resources for a counterattack and amounts
spent to construct fortiﬁcations would be ineﬀective relative to amounts spent to
mobilize resources for an attack, then the states cannot reach a credible peaceful
settlement, with the resulting border either unfortiﬁed or fortiﬁed, that would be
preferable to a default to war.
Figure 2 depicts conditions (18) and (21) and Propositions (I), (II), and (III).
Divisibility
We now turn to relaxing our working assumptions, beginning with the assumption that
the whole of the territory is neither more nor less valuable than the sum of its parts. To
be more general, assume that the value of permanently controlling the fraction ki of the
contested territory would be k
1/σ
i V, where σ ∈ (0, 1]. The parameter, σ, calibrates the
divisibility of the territory.




























¡ ¡ ªFigure 2:















AF o r t i ﬁed Border WarIf σ equals one, as implicitly we have been assuming, the value of controlling the fraction
ki of the territory would be exactly equal to ki times the value of controlling the entire
territory. In this case dividing the territory would be costless.
In contrast, if σ is smaller than one, then the value of controlling the fraction ki of
the territory would be smaller than ki times the value of controlling the entire territory. In
this case the whole of the territory is more valuable than the sum of its parts, and dividing
the territory would be costly.11
Given that the winner of a war would gain permanent control of the contested territory,
the expected payoﬀs to a default to war and to breaking a promise not to attack do not
depend on σ. But, as σ becomes smaller than one, the payoﬀ to any peaceful settlement
that divides control of the contested territory becomes smaller.12
To analyze the eﬀect of costly divisibility, begin by replacing ki in condition (5) with
k
1/σ






















, is smaller than one.
Using condition (6σ)s u p p o s e t h a tσ is equal to or smaller than one half. With this
parameterization, controlling half of the territory would be one quarter or less as valuable
as controlling the entire territory. With σ equal to or smaller than one half, and given
that both N1 and N2 equal V/4, the set of nonnegative values of R∗
1 and R∗
2 such
11As σ approaches zero, the territory becomes indivisible. An example would be a territory that either
one of the states perceives, for either geopolitical or symbolic reasons, to be essential for its survival.
12If side payments in the form of monetary or other compensation are possible, then the states could
reach a peaceful settlement that avoids a costly division of a contested territory. Fearon (1995) argues
that side payments “typically” are feasible. Hence, he claims that costly divisibility does not provide a
“compelling” reason for failure to settle territorial disputes peacefully. Other scholars, however, claim that











is smaller than one is empty. Thus, condition (6σ)
implies that, if σ were equal to or smaller than one half, then, because the winner of a
war would control the entire contested territory, the payoﬀ from a peaceful settlement, even
with the resulting border unfortiﬁed, could not be larger for both states than the expected
payoﬀ from a default to war. Thus, we have the following extension of Proposition (III):
(IIIσ) If the whole of the contested territory is worth suﬃciently more than
the sum of its parts, then the states cannot reach a peaceful settlement, with the
resulting border either unfortiﬁed or fortiﬁed, that would be preferable to a default
to war.
S u p p o s e ,a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,t h a t σ is larger than one half. In this case, condition (6σ)i m p l i e s
that there exist peaceful settlements that both states would prefer to a default to war. But,
would such peaceful settlements be credible?
To answer this question, replace ki in condition (16) with k
1/σ
i . With this generalization
condition (17) becomes
(17σ)1 − Zσ
2 ≥ k1 ≥ Zσ
1 .
There exists at least one value of k1 that satisﬁes condition (17σ) if and only if the sum,
Zσ
1 + Zσ
2 , i sn o tl a r g e rt h a no n e .
Consider again the possibility of a peaceful settlement with an unfortiﬁed border. From
equation (15) and the deﬁnition of Zi we ﬁnd that both R∗
1 and R∗
2 equal to zero is
consistent with the sum, Zσ
1 +Zσ
2 , being not larger than one if and only if the parameters






Condition (18σ) implies the following generalization of Proposition (I):
15(Iσ) If amounts spent to mobilize resources for a counterattack would be suf-
ﬁciently eﬀective relative to amounts spent to mobilize resources for an attack,
and if dividing the territory would not be too costly, then the states can
reach a credible peaceful settlement with an unfortiﬁed border.
If γ/θ and σ do not satisfy condition (18σ), then the states again would be limited to
considering peaceful settlements with both φR∗
1 and φR∗





Solving the quadratic equation obtained by setting Zσ
1 +Zσ
2 equal to one, we ﬁnd that the
minimum values of R∗
1 and R∗
2 that would satisfy the condition, Zσ
1 + Zσ














According to condition (6σ), both states would prefer a peaceful settlement to a default to
war only if R∗
1 and R∗











is smaller than one. For the minimum values of R∗
1 and R∗
2 given by equation (20σ)t o

















Condition (21σ) implies the following generalization of Proposition (II):
(IIσ) If a peaceful settlement with an unfortiﬁed border would not be credible, but
if amounts spent to construct fortiﬁcations would be suﬃciently eﬀective relative
to amounts spent to mobilize resources for an attack, and if dividing the
territory would not be too costly, then the states can reach a peaceful
settlement with a fortiﬁed border that is credible and preferable to a default to
war.
In addition, equation (20σ) implies that in such a peaceful settlement the amount that each
state would have to spend to construct fortiﬁcations would be a decreasing function of σ.
Figures 3 and 4 depict Propositions (Iσ), (IIσ), and (IIIσ).
16Figure 3:












AF o r t i ﬁed Border
or War
WarFigure 4:












AF o r t i ﬁed
Border
WarA Recurring Possibility of War
So far we have assumed that a war would settle the territorial dispute permanently. To
relax this assumption, assume that a state that wins a war would gain control of the contested
territory only for a single ﬁnite period, where a period is the amount of time, measured in
standard units of time, such as years, that it would take for the states to rearm and prepare
for a new war. Under this assumption the states face a recurring possibility of war.
Let v, v ∈ (0,∞), denote the value of having control of the entire contested territory for
a single period. Assuming that v does not vary over time, the present value, V, of having
permanent control of the entire contested territory equals v/(1 − ρ), where ρ, ρ ∈ [0,1),
is the discount factor that corresponds to the length of a period. Given V, the shorter is a
period, the smaller is v, and the larger is ρ. Speciﬁcally, if q, q ∈ [0,1), is the discount
factor applicable to a periodicity of one year, and if it would take m years to rearm and
prepare for a new war, then ρ equals qm. The working assumption that a war would settle
the territorial dispute permanently corresponds to the limiting case of v equal to V, and
ρ equal to zero.
To focus on the eﬀects of a recurring possibility of war, abstract from the ability to
counterattack by assuming that γ equals zero. Condition (18) implies that, under the
assumption that the winner of a war would get permanent control of the contested territory,
a credible peaceful settlement with an unfortiﬁed border would not be possible with γ equal
to zero. Also, abstract from the problem of costly divisibility by again assuming that σ
equals one. Condition (21) implies that, with σ equal to one, a peaceful settlement with








Assuming that, in the event of a default to recurring war, the expected payoﬀ for State








17where Ni now denotes the expected payoﬀ for State i from a default to recurring war.
Given equation (1ρ), equations (4) become




Comparing equations (4ρ) with equations (4) we see that, given V, because the amounts that
the states would spend to mobilize resources in the event of a default to war are proportionate
to v, the expected payoﬀ from a default to war does not depend on whether or not war
would be recurring.
As in the standard theory of repeated games, assume that, with states facing a recurring
possibility of war, as long as both states keep their promises not to attack, they can continue
to make credible promises not to attack. But, if either state were to break its promise not
to attack, then future peaceful settlements would be precluded. In that event, starting in
the next period, the states would have to bear the costs of a recurring default to war.13
Under these assumptions the expected payoﬀ to State i from breaking its promise not to
attack becomes
(8ρ) ˜ Ni =˜ piv − (R
∗
i + ˜ Ri)+ρV/4=˜ pi(1 − ρ)V − (R
∗
i + ˜ Ri)+ρV/4,
Equation (8ρ) amends equation (8) in accord with the assumption that a state that attacks
and wins a war would gain control of the entire contested territory for the current period,
but would expect to obtain in future periods only the expected value of a default to recurring
war. Given equation (8ρ), and assuming that γ equals zero, equation (15) becomes











i + ρV/4f o r φR∗
j ≤ (1 − ρ)θV
−R∗
i + ρV/4f o r φR∗
j > (1 − ρ)θV,
13These assumptions accord with the Garﬁnkel’s (1990) analysis of the possibility of armed peace. In
Garﬁnkel’s model states contest control over capital stocks that are endogenously determined. The present
analysis is simpliﬁed by taking the value of controlling the contested territory to be exogenous.
18Again the credibility condition is ki ≥ Zi, where Zi ≡ ( ˜ Ni+R∗
i)/V, and again there exists
at least one value of k1 that satisﬁes these credibility conditions if and only if the sum,
Z1 + Z2, is not larger than one.
Consider again the possibility of a peaceful settlement with an unfortiﬁed border. Given
equation (15ρ)a n dt h ed e ﬁnition of Zi, both R∗
1 and R∗
2 equal to zero is consistent with
Z1 + Z2 being not larger than one if and only if the discount factor, ρ, satisﬁes
(18ρ) ρ ≥ 2/3.
To interpret condition (18ρ), observe that if, for example, the annual discount factor equals
about 9/10, then, because 2/3 equals approximately (9/10)4, a value of ρ equal to or larger
than 2/3 corresponds to a potential recurrence of war more frequently than approximately
every four years.
Condition (18ρ) implies the following extension of Proposition (I).
(Iρ) I fw a rc o u l dr e c u rw i t hs u ﬃcient frequency, then the states can reach a
credible peaceful settlement with an unfortiﬁed border, regardless of the relative
eﬀectiveness of amounts spent to mobilize resources for a counterattack.
Suppose that ρ does not satisfy condition (18ρ). In that case, with γ equal to zero, the
states would be limited to considering the possibility of a peaceful settlement with a fortiﬁed
border. For positive values of R∗
1 and R∗
2 equation (19) becomes
(19ρ) Zi =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨


















j > (1 − ρ)θV.
Solving the quadratic equation obtained by setting Z1 + Z2 equal to one, we ﬁnd that
equation (20), which gives the minimum values of R∗
1 and R∗
2 that would satisfy the


















19Recall that, with σ equal to one, both states would prefer a peaceful settlement to a
default to war only if R∗
1 +R∗
2 is smaller than V/2, which now equals (R1 +R2)/(1−ρ).
For R∗
1 + R∗
2, as implied by equation (20ρ), to be smaller than V/2, the parameters φ,















Condition (21ρ) implies that a peaceful settlement with a fortiﬁed border that is credible







condition (21ρ) implies the following extension of Proposition (II):
(IIρ) If a peaceful settlement with an unfortiﬁed border would not be credible,
but war could recur with suﬃcient frequency, then the states can reach a peaceful
settlement with a fortiﬁed border that is credible and preferable to a default to
war, even if amounts spent to construct fortiﬁc a t i o n sw o u l dn o tb eh i g h l ye ﬀective
relative to amounts spent to mobilize resources for an attack.
In addition, equation (20ρ) implies that in such a peaceful settlement the amount that each
state would have to spend to construct fortiﬁcations would be a decreasing function of ρ.
Figure 5 depicts conditions (18ρ)a n d( 2 1 ρ) and Propositions (Iρ)a n d( I I ρ). Both of
these propositions are applications of standard results from the theory of repeated games.
Depreciation and Obsolescence
We now turn to the working assumption that fortiﬁcations neither depreciate nor become
obsolete. To relax this assumption, assume that fortiﬁcations must be rebuilt periodically,
where a period now is the useful lifetime of fortiﬁcations, measured in standard units of
time, such as years. Accordingly, the present value of the cost of maintaining a fortiﬁcation
that entailed an initial expenditure of R∗
i would be R∗
i/(1 − δ), where δ, δ ∈ [0,1),
is the discount factor that corresponds to the periodicity with which fortiﬁcations must be
20Figure 5:














AF o r t i ﬁed Borderrebuilt. The shorter is a period the larger is δ. Speciﬁcally, if q is the discount factor
applicable to a periodicity of one year, and if fortiﬁcations must be rebuilt every n years,
then δ equals qn. The working assumption that fortiﬁcations neither depreciate nor become
obsolete corresponds to the limiting case of δ equal to zero.
To focus on the eﬀects of depreciation and obsolescence, abstract from the problem of
costly divisibility by again assuming that σ equals one. Also, assume again that the winner
of a war would get permanent control of the contested territory.
With fortiﬁcations having to be rebuilt periodically, the payoﬀ for State i from a peaceful
settlement that required an initial expenditure of R∗
i on fortiﬁcations would be kiV −
R∗
i/(1 − δ). Hence, condition (5) becomes
(5δ) kiV − R
∗

















<V / 2=R1 + R2.
Condition (7δ) says that both states would prefer a peaceful settlement to a default to war
only if the present value of the cost for the twos t a t e so fc o n s t r u c t i n ga n dm a i n t a i n i n g
fortiﬁcations under a peaceful settlement would be smaller than total amount that the two
states would spend to mobilize resources in the event of a default to war.
Would a peaceful settlement with (R∗
1+R∗
2)/(1−δ) smaller than R1+R2 be credible?
To answer this question observe that with the payoﬀ from a peaceful settlement equal to
kiV − R∗
i/(1 − δ), and with ˜ Ni again given by equation (15), equation (16) becomes
(16δ) ki ≥ Zi, where Zi ≡




21Again, there exists at least one value of k1 that satisﬁes condition (17), 1−Z2 ≥ k1 ≥ Z1,
if and only if the sum, Z1 + Z2, is not larger than one.
Depreciation and obsolescence of fortiﬁcations obviously do not aﬀect the possibility of a
credible peaceful settlement with an unfortiﬁed border. Hence, both R∗
1 and R∗
2 equal to
zero is consistent with Z1 +Z2 being not larger than one if and only if again γ/θ satisﬁes
condition (18), γ/θ ≥
√
2 − 1.
Suppose that γ/θ does not satisfy condition (18). In that case, the states again would
be limited to considering the possibility of a peaceful settlement with a fortiﬁed border and
with both φR∗
1 and φR∗










, equation (19) becomes
(19δ) Zi =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨


























The quadratic equation obtained by setting Z1+Z2, as implied by equation (19δ), equal
to one implies that the minimum values of R∗
1 and R∗
2 that would satisfy the condition,





















Equation (20δ) implies that there exist values of R∗
1 and R∗
2 that would satisfy the
condition, Z1 + Z2 ≤ 1, only if δ/(1 − δ) is not larger than φ/θ. Thus, equation (20δ)
implies the following extension of Proposition (III):
(IIIδ) If fortiﬁcations depreciate or become obsolete suﬃciently rapidly, then the
states cannot reach a peaceful settlement with a fortiﬁed border that would be
credible and preferable to a default to war.14
14The logic of this proposition is similar to the logic of the example in Garﬁnkel and Stergios Skaperdas
22If δ/(1 − δ) is not larger than φ/θ, then for the sum of R∗
1 and R∗
2 implied by
equation (20δ) to satisfy condition (7δ), the parameters φ, θ, and δ must satisfy

















The LHS of condition (21δ)i sd e c r e a s i n gi n δ and increasing in φ/θ, whereas the RHS
of condition (21δ)i si n c r e a s i n gi n δ and decreasing in φ/θ. Thus, condition (21δ)i m p l i e s
that, even if δ/(1−δ) is not larger than φ/θ, the larger is δ the larger must be φ/θ in
order for a peaceful settlement with a fortiﬁed border to be possible. Thus, condition (21δ)
implies the following extension of Proposition (II):
(IIδ) If fortiﬁcations do not either depreciate or become obsolete too rapidly, and
if amounts spent to construct fortiﬁcations would be suﬃciently eﬀective relative
to amounts spent to mobilize resources for an attack, then the states can reach
a peaceful settlement with a fortiﬁed border that is credible and preferable to a
default to war.
Equation (20δ) also implies that in such a peaceful settlement the amount that each state
would have to spend on fortiﬁcations would be an increasing function of δ.
Figure 6 depicts condition (21δ) and Proposition (IIδ). In interpreting Figure 6, ob-
serve that, if the annual discount factor equals about 9/10, then, because 7/16 equals
approximately (9/10)8, av a l u eo f δ smaller than 7/16 corresponds to a need to rebuild
fortiﬁcations less frequently than approximately every eight years.
Unequal Eﬀectiveness of Amounts Spent to Mobilize Resources
Finally we come to the working assumption that the two states have the same eﬀectiveness
of amounts spent to mobilize resources. To relax this assumption, let θi measure the
(2000) in which a war that would settle a dispute permanently can be preferable to an armed peace in which
fortiﬁcations must be rebuilt periodically.
23Figure 6: A Fortiﬁed Border or War












AF o r t i ﬁed
Border
Wareﬀectiveness of amounts spent by State i to mobilize resources either in the event of a
default to war or in the event that State i were to break its promise not to attack, where θi
and θj can be unequal, and let γi measure the eﬀectiveness of amounts spent by State i
to mobilize resources for a counterattack, where γi and γj can be unequal.
Consider again the possibility of a peaceful settlement with an unfortiﬁed border. If θi
and θj can be unequal, equation (2), the contest-success function that applies in the event





If, in addition, γi and γj can be unequal, then equation (9), the contest-success function
that applies in the event that State i were to break its promise not to attack, becomes, with
R∗
j equal to zero,
(9u)˜ pi =
θi ˜ Ri
θi ˜ Ri + γjR∗∗
j
.
Using equations (2u)a n d( 9 u) in place of equations (2) and (9), and assuming again that
σ equals one and that δ and ρ equal zero, we ﬁn d ,a si ss h o w ni nt h em a t h e m a t i c a l












Under the working assumption of equal eﬀectiveness of amounts spent to mobilize resources,
condition (18u) would be identical to condition (18), γ/θ ≥
√
2−1. Thus, condition (18u)
implies that, if both γ2/θ1 and γ1/θ2 were equal to (or larger than)
√
2 − 1, then a
credible peaceful settlement with an unfortiﬁed border would be possible.
But, condition (18u) also implies that, if the average of γ2/θ1 and γ1/θ2 were equal
to
√
2−1, but if γ2/θ1 was not equal to γ1/θ2, then a credible peaceful settlement with
an unfortiﬁed border would not be possible. Thus, condition (18u) implies the following
extension of Proposition (I):
24(Iu) Unequal eﬀectiveness of amounts spent to mobilize resources can preclude a
peaceful settlement that would be credible if the two states had equal eﬀectiveness
of amounts spent to mobilize resources.
Figure (7) illustrates Proposition (Iu). This proposition follows from the nonlinearity of the
contest-success functions.
Summary
This paper has analyzed a choice-theoretic model in which a territorial dispute between
sovereign states can aﬀord either a peaceful settlement with an unfortiﬁed border, or, if not,
perhaps a peaceful settlement with a fortiﬁed border, or possibly only a default to war. The
essential premise of the model is that states can settle a dispute peacefully only if their
payoﬀs from a peaceful settlement are larger than their expected payoﬀs from a default to
war, and their promises not to attack are credible. The model assumes that all parameters
are common knowledge, thereby abstracting from incomplete information as a cause of war.
The following are the main results of our analysis:
• A large advantage of attacking over counterattacking precludes a peaceful settlement
w i t ha nu n f o r t i ﬁed border.
• A large advantage of attacking over defending precludes a peaceful settlement with a
fortiﬁed border.
• A high cost of dividing the contested territory precludes a peaceful settlement with
the border either unfortiﬁed or fortiﬁed.
• The possibility of recurring war enhances the possibility of a peaceful settlement with
the border either unfortiﬁed or fortiﬁed.
• Rapid depreciation or obsolescence of fortiﬁcations precludes a peaceful settlement
with a fortiﬁed border.
• Unequal eﬀectiveness of amounts spent to mobilize resources can preclude a peaceful
settlement with the border either unfortiﬁed or fortiﬁed.
25Figure 7: An Unfortiﬁed Border with




































¡ ¡ ªMathematical Appendix
Derivation of Condition (18u):









and equations (4), which give the expected payoﬀ to a default to war, become
(4u) Ri =
θiθj






Using equations (8) and (9u), equation (10) becomes, with R∗
j equal to zero,








Using equations (9u) and (11), equation (12), becomes, with R∗
j equal to zero,
(12u) γjR
∗∗
j =m a x
½q
θiV γj ˜ Ri − θi ˜ Ri, 0
¾
.
Combining equations (10u)a n d( 1 2 u), equations (13) and (14) become




(θi + γj)2 V,
and equation (15) becomes







i equal to zero, the credibility condition (16) becomes
(16u) ki ≥ ˜ Ni/V.
Accordingly, condition (17) becomes
(17u)1 − ˜ N2/V ≥ k1 ≥ ˜ N1/V,
There exists at least one value of k1 that satisﬁes condition (17u) if and only if ( ˜ N1+ ˜ N2)/V
i sn o tl a r g e rt h a no n e .H e n c e ,c o n d i t i o n( 1 8 u).
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